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Abstract
From the onset of the 2007-2009 crisis, the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have
aggressively lowered interest rates. Both sets of changes are at odds with an anti-in ationary stance
of monetary policy; indeed, as the crisis began in August 2007 in ation expectations were high and
rising, particularly in the United States. We have two additions to the literature. One, we present
a model economy with a leveraged and regulated nancial sector. Two, we nd optimal Taylor rules
for our economy that are consistent with a strong pro-in ationary reaction during nancial crisis while
maintaining a standard output-in ation mandate. We have three interpretations of our results. One,
because the Federal Reserve has partial control over bank regulation it can exercise regulatory lenience.
Two, the Fed’s stronger output orientation means that it will potentially respond more quickly when
faced with constrained banks. Three, our results support procyclical capital regulation.
JEL Classication: E52, E58, G18, G28
key words: monetary policy, capital regulation, crisis5
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From the onset of the 2007-2009 crisis, the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have aggres-
sively lowered interest rates. Both sets of changes are at odds with an anti-in ationary stance of monetary
policy; indeed, as the crisis began in August 2007 in ation expectations were high and rising, particularly
in the United States. We begin by proposing a model of the economy that includes leveraged and regulated
nancial sector. The result is that the modeled central bank must consider two states of the world: a well-
capitalized (unconstrained) one and an under-capitalized (constrained) one. Meshing this with a standard
monetary policy stance in which the central bank maintains a mandate on in ation and growth (Fed) or
in ation alone (ECB) provides our insights. The key feature of the model will be that banks cannot legally
write new loans when undercapitalized. Many current models of monetary policy include a bank lending
channel; monetary policy is magnied by the presence of a leveraged banking sector. However, if banks
cannot lend when undercapitalized, this implies that monetary policy necessarily changes at the point of
capital (in)adequacy. As expected then, the model shows the absence of a bank capital channel when the
economy is capital constrained. Based on this model, we nd it makes little sense to estimate a single policy
(Taylor) rule across both constrained and unconstrained regimes. Thus, we construct empirical estimates of
optimal policy when the two regimes are considered separately. Once implemented, our empirical analysis
nds rules consistent with the data: a strong pro-in ationary reaction during nancial crisis and a standard
output-in ation mandate for the central bank.
We have three interpretations of our results. One, because the Federal Reserve has partial control over
bank regulation it can exercise regulatory lenience as a part of monetary policy. We explain this below. Two,
the Fed’s stronger output orientation means that it will potentially respond more quickly when faced with
constrained banks and the lack of an accelerator. Three, our results support procyclical capital regulation
not because of adequacy concerns, but instead because of the impact on monetary policy.
The most remarkable nding is the presence of a large negative value for Federal Reserve’s response to
movements in the rate of in ation in the constrained state that qualitatively matches the Federal Reserve
actions during the crisis. A large negative number implies that the central bank will counterintuitively lower
interest rates in the face of rising in ation. This is likely to stoke in ation and increase it further, leading
to spiraling increasing rates. The only way for the economy to recover is for bank capital to rise and return
the economy to the unconstrained state in which the central bank will then work in the opposite direction.
So, why pursue this path? Lowering the interest rate has the eect, in our model, of devaluing debt. By
doing so, this directly increases bank capital. Since the bank has no way to impact the real economy as the
accelerator has disappeared, the only way to recover is to impose an in ation-based transfer to the banking
sector. To the extent that one can view the crisis as a shock to bank capital, the most eective solution is
to lower interest rates and accommodate in ation. This pattern would then be reversed at the point that
bank capitalization has returned to the unconstrained state.
Our principal European result is that the coe!cient on the monetary policy sensitivity to interest rates
in both states of the world is larger than the US equivalent. We again observe a negative coe!cient on
the in ation parameter, but it remains close to zero even in the constrained state. This is consistent both
with mandate dierences and observed policy. A notable feature of the dierence between US and European
monetary reactions to the crisis was the timing of the reaction. This dierence is in part described by the
dierence in output responsiveness. Another reason lies in the ‘distance’ to the constrained region. This
can be seen as follows. Consider that prior to the crisis, both the US and Europe banks held a given, and
equal level of capital. A lower baseline capital requirement in Europe means that the European Central6
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Bank monetary changes will have an accelerator impact even when US actions are insu!cient. Thus for
similar levels of shock, the US will necessary enter the constrained state sooner than Europe. Finally, recall
that the set of results in based on a calibration that re ects dierences in capital thresholds as well as
monetary stance. Thus, one can interpret the outcomes as re ective of the combination of monetary stance
and regulatory regime. Our interpretation is that the relatively stronger anti-in ationary stance of ECB in
the face of a crisis emerges both as a function of its mandate and the fact that it had greater  exibility is
exercising monetary policy prior to its banking sector becoming fully constrained. Thus, a relatively smaller
change in policy rates could lead to a larger economic eect.
We emphasize two policy implications of our results. One, the Federal Reserve has partial control over
bank regulation as well as full control over monetary policy. This permits it to exercise regulatory lenience as
a part of monetary policy. It can set an initially higher capital threshold, and lower it in the face of a crisis.
This permits some  exibility in times of moderate stress, but also requires the willingness to face in ation
risk in times of crisis. Once banks hit the capital threshold, the situation is truly dire. Two, our results
our consistent with procyclical capital regulation. However, we reach this conclusion not due to the need to
support a stressed nancial sector in times of crisis, but rather because the interaction between monetary
policy and bank regulation necessitates it.
Optimal regulation
We nd a strong incentive for a joint monetary/regulatory authority such as the Federal Reserve to ensure
that nancial institutions remain above the capital constraint. In times of falling asset values, banks will
approach or fall below capital requirements, rendering monetary policy ineective at stimulating lending.
At this point, the monetary/regulatory authority has an incentive to lower capital requirements in order to
facilitate monetary intervention. We note in the paper that this may in fact lead to lower long run output
volatility.
Pro-cyclicality
As has been acknowledged, bank capital follows a cyclical pattern. This cyclicality combined with a xed
capital requirement can lead to excess capital in good times and insu!cient capital in bad times. Thus as
the economy begins to contract, and banks experience loan losses, they will become less likely to lend as their
capital cushions erode. Indeed, regulators may be in a position to shut down institutions that are simply
facing cyclical losses, but will soon recover with the rest of the economy. This implies a potential solution
of cycle-dependent capital requirements. Our model suggests a second set of reasons for this type of cyclical
requirement. In ‘bad’ times as banks becomes capital constrained, not only is their lending impacted, but
monetary policy changes as well. As we have demonstrated, because the e!cacy of policy changes, the stance
of policy necessarily changes as well. Thus, a pro-cyclical regulatory policy has the potential to ameliorate
boom-bust monetary policy cycles.
We believe that there are likely many reasons for the dierences in ECB and Fed policies over the past
two years. Among these are dierence in mandate emphasis between the two that lead to stronger anti-
in ationary emphasis at the ECB, dierences in the timing of impact on the banking sector, and many
others. That said, the model presented here is both consistent with both authorities’ actions and is capable
of reproducing the stylized features of each. With this framework in place, there are potentially more open
questions that lie beyond the scope of this paper. As mentioned, the Federal Reserve has responsibility
both for monetary policy and bank regulation of some of the nancial system. Indeed, much of the response
to the crisis in the United States consisted of extraordinary support to banking institutions; this is largely7
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equivalent to a relaxation of capital requirements. Thus, to what extent does the ability to change regulatory
requirements jointly with monetary policy change the optimization problem? We would hypothesize that
this is consistent with current patterns - a relatively higher capital requirement in normal times in the US
and stronger monetary policy during times of crisis. However, this is a topic that we leave for future study.8
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Our paper has two contributions to the literature. One, we construct a model economy with a leveraged and
regulated nancial sector. It shows nancial accelerator characteristics in normal times; that is, in the state
of the world in which banks do not face regulatory capital constraints, there is a signicant amplication
of monetary policy. More importantly, the model shows the absence of an accelerator when the economy is
capital constrained. Our second contribution is to calibrate the model to both the US and Europe. We use
separate calibrations to nd rules appropriate to each environment. We nd 1) a stronger anti-in ationary
stance for the ECB in normal times. 2) a much stronger willingness by the Federal Reserve to sacrice
in ation risk for output in times of crisis.
We have three interpretations of our results. One, the Federal Reserve has partial control over bank
regulation as well as full control over monetary policy. This permits it to exercise regulatory lenience as a
part of monetary policy. It can set an initially higher capital threshold, and lower it in the face of a crisis.
This permits some  exibility in times of moderate stress, but also requires the willingness to face in ation risk
in times of crisis. Once banks hit the capital threshold, the situation is truly dire. Two, a stronger output
orientation by the Fed means that it will potentially respond more quickly when faced with constrained
banks and the lack of an accelerator. Three, our results our consistent with procyclical capital regulation.
However, we reach this conclusion not due to the need to support a stressed nancial sector in times of crisis,
but rather because of the interaction between monetary policy and bank regulation necessitates it.
Our approach is to incorporate a very simple nancial friction into a new-Keynesian synthesis model.
The constraint is a regulatory capital minimum for the banking sector.1 This implies two states of the
world: well-capitalized (unconstrained) and under-capitalized (constrained).2 We mesh this with a standard
formulation of monetary policy in which the central bank maintains a mandate on in ation and growth (Fed)
or in ation alone (ECB).
Our motivation for this is to assess the implications for monetary policy and bank regulation using only
very minor deviations from a synthesis model. We wish to explain patterns of monetary policy from a
positive (and normative) perspective without needing to adjust classic, or legislated, views of the role of
monetary policy or resorted to other types of nancial frictions. Our sole friction is the inability of bank to
write new loans when undercapitalized. Of course, in the presence of a bank lending channel, this implies
that monetary policy necessarily changes at the point of capital (in)adequacy.
Our conclusion is then that it makes little sense to estimate a single policy rule across both constrained
and unconstrained regimes. Thus, we construct empirical estimates of optimal policy when the two regimes
are considered separately. We illustrate the motivation for this using a simple diagram (see Figure 1).
Notice that the regulatory threshold produces the nonlinear eect of an increasingly strong monetary policy
as banks approach the constraint, due to the fact that leverage is rising. However, once the constraint is
reached, monetary policy cannot impact lending as banks are legally prevented from expanding lending.
1Borio and Zhu (2007) argue that regulatory constraints lead to eective lending limits even if they are not fully eclipsed.
The argument is that as banks near the capital limits, the combination of the risk of crossing the threshold and the possibly
of government intervention has a similar dampening eect on lending. In our model, lending becomes constrained only at the
point of inadequacy.
2Cechetti and Li (2008) take an important rst step in this direction by looking at two isolated regimes.9
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Broadly, the recent crisis has highlighted the fact that rst-generation new-Keynesian models are not
well-equipped to interpret the role of monetary policy under nancial stress. They were based on a couple of
classic imperfections, such as nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition, to allow for non-trivial market
power and price setting. The goal, of course, was to illustrate how demand shifts could impact output, and
thus how monetary policy shifting the demand could have real eects. These constructs permitted an
extensive literature that could study the basic role of policy. The models, however, omitted details of market
imperfections that are central to the study of macroeconomics. This omission is in part responsible for the
fact that consensus Taylor rules cannot describe the path of monetary policy (Rudebusch 2006). A new
round of (second-generation) new-Keynesian models focuses on the implications of other frictions. Because
of the current nancial crisis, a number of new papers,3 this one included, have turned their attention to
the role of nancial and credit market imperfections by building on work by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilcrist
(1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001). Indeed, there is renewed interest in a real economy link that passes
through the banking sector.
The channel through the banking sector is now widely believed to play an important role in the conduct
of monetary policy and highlights the importance of banking regulation. According to one hypothesis, the
previous ‘credit crunch’ in the United States was at least partly a consequence of banks’ eagerness to meet
the 1992 deadline for capital adequacy requirements under the 1988 Basel agreement (Bernanke and Lown,
1991). This argument as well as the realization that regulation has to date, including Basel I and Basel II,
been largely a study in individual bank risk management. As such, policy makers have re-emphasized the
need both to incorporate cyclicality into prudential regulation (Borio et al, 2001) as well as to approach
regulation from what has been called a macro-prudential perspective (Borio 2003, and many others).
Why does this matter? Indeed, within the new-Keynesian framework now common for the analysis
of monetary policy, one typically rules out real impacts of the nancial sector. Evidence from both the
nancial crisis in the late 1980s when banks saw large real-estate related write-down and the current crisis
has suggested that the role of the nancial sector may be important in the transmission of real shocks. Indeed,
the monetary authority reactions are discordant with an estimated Taylor rule (see Rudebusch, 2006). This
of course requires little systematic analysis to observe; the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank
have dramatically lowered their respective principal policy rates in less than a year, even in the face of rising
in ation. This soundly rejects models that in isolation would assume an anti-in ation stance of policy.
To provide a potential solution to this question, we turn our attention to the nexus of monetary policy
and bank regulation. In particular, we ask how one can evaluate the macroeconomy in an environment
where the monetary authority must cope with regulated banking sector. The potential con ict between
central bankers and nancial supervisors has been noted before. A range of research has found that capital
adequacy requirements, while potentially important for nancial stability, can also be procyclical.4 Of course,
if monetary policy is intended to promote stable economic growth, its countercyclical bias will run counter
3Two recent papers by De Fiore and Tristani (2008) and Curdia and Woodford (2008) make an attempt to characterize
monetary policy in a model with nancial frictions are important. The former focuses on the specics of loan contracts to derive
implications, while the latter uses a very  exible, but reduced form characterization of frictions. Perhaps more importantly,
Curdia and Woodford rely on bank intermediation between households. In this latter model, the linking function allows for
a wide variety of characterizations of the link between frictions and monetary policy. Other examples that include nancial
frictions of various types include Ravenna and Walsh (2006), Faia and Monacelli (2006), Christiano et al., (2006).
4The literature on the procyclicality of adequacy requirements is quite large. Berger and Udell (1994), Blum and Hellwig
(1995), Brinkmann and Horvitz (1995), Thakor (1996); recent papers include Goodhard et al. (2004), Estrella (2004), Kashyap
and Stein (2004), Gordy and Howells (2006).10
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to bank regulation. A joint authority now has the advantage (or the problem) that policy decisions must
account for both factors.
The presence of a regulated banking sector matters for our purposes here because it provides a potential
explanation for the apparent inconsistency in monetary policy during crisis periods. We focus on ‘crises’ as
dened by shocks to bank capital. In a new-Keynesian model of the economy with no nancial frictions,
bank capital shocks are irrelevant. Bank lending is typically determined completely by available deposits.
Thus, capital shocks have no impact on the real economy. In a world with either leverage or some other
type of nancial sector friction, economic shocks and monetary policy are amplied through the nancial
sector (Bernanke et al., 1989). Of course, even in this world, the implied optimal policy rules cannot explain
dramatic reductions in interest rates in the face of in ationary pressures.
As noted, in a regulated banking sector, nancial sector leverage has legal limits. Thus shocks that
impact bank capital pass through to limitations on lending. In most cases, this is similar to the Bernanke et
al. (1989) world in that economic shocks are magnied by the nancial sector, in this case through a leverage
eect. However, a su!ciently large shock to bank capital changes the nature of the ‘accelerator.’ When
bank capital falls below a regulatory requirement, lending is capped. Thus, the leverage eect vanishes and
monetary policy becomes ineective at stimulating the real economy until bank capitalization rises again
above the constraint.5
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our extension of the Bernanke et al. (1999) nancial
accelerator. We continue in section 3 with a discussion of the setup for our simulation exercises and show
some results in section 4. Section 5 provides some discussion and we conclude in section 6.
2 The Benchmark Model
We build a variant of the nancial accelerator model with sticky-price features of Bernanke et al. (1999),
to include a Taylor rule as a modern characterization of monetary policy, and to enhance the structural
denition of the banking system. We add a nancial intermediary that takes deposits from the households
and lends them to the rms to pay for the capital rental bill. We also introduce the regulatory feature of
adequacy requirements on the bank’s own capital and reserve requirements on deposits. There are a number
of reasons behind this choice for the specication of nancial frictions. For starters, the Bernanke et al.
(1999) model shares an important characteristic with the framework of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in that
asset price movements serve to reenforce credit market imperfections, which lead Gomes et al. (2003) to
discard the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) framework6.
Our model illustrates that an economy with banks that are adequately capitalized but without a buer
(credit-constrained) is often more responsive to monetary relaxation than an unconstrained economy. Simi-
larly crucial is the fact that an undercapitalized banking system is more likely to lead to a credit-constrained
5In practice, this treshold may be of relevance both at the true regulatory limit and at points above the threshold in which
banks are constrained in the ability to lend due to the relative cost of increases in the capital base is su!ciently high. As
has been observed in the crisis of 2007-2008, there is great reluctance amongst banks to issue new equity or cut dividends at
precisely the time in which economic conditions may be deteriorating. This can lead to a delay in eort to raise capital until
the possibility of a breach of the regulatory limit is imminent. Long before this point, banks can curtail lending (See Borio
and Zhu 2007 for a discussion).
6Faia and Monacelli (2007) and Walentin (2005) provide an insightful theoretical comparative analysis of the Bernanke et
al. (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) frameworks.11
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outcome or a ‘credit crunch’. Financial institutions can become unresponsive as they use rate reductions
to increase margins on existing loans to shore up capital rather than to expand lending. The combination
of these two features suggests variable impacts of monetary policy above the constraint point and a sharp
nonlinearity at the point where credit markets become constrained (see Figure 1, Panel A).
Our baseline model is essentially a stochastic business cycle model that incorporates monopolistic com-
petition and nominal price rigidities, modied to allow nancial intermediation to play a role on nancing
investment.7 We allow banks to accumulated capital directly and to take on deposits. Then we impose
reserve levels and capital adequacy requirements to capture the essence of the regulatory framework under
which the banking system operates.
The model is populated by households, capital producers, wholesale producers, retailers, banks, and
the central bank. Households own and operate all the rms. Capital producers determine a price for
capital. Retailers are distinguished from wholesale producers in order to introduce price inertia in a tractable
manner. Wholesale producers themselves are operated through rms or entrepreneurs subject to idiosyncratic
shocks and, therefore, exposed to bankruptcy. We also add a banking system that intermediates between the
households and the wholesale producer rms. The nancial intermediation occurs in an environment where
capital returns on defaulting rms are not observable, so loan contracts are designed to reduce the agency
costs associated. Funds must be raised from households. Finally, a central bank is added with powers to set
both banking regulation as well as monetary policy.
2.1 Description of the Model
Since the model of Bernanke et al. (1999) is quite well-known, we refrain from a detailed discussion of their
rst principles. This section describes the log-linearized version of the model and its variants to make the
presentation more compact. For more details, we refer the reader to the original paper or suggest further
readings along the way. We specify a stochastic general equilibrium model populated by a continuum
of innitely-lived (and identical) households in the interval [0>1]. Households maximize utility additively
separable on consumption and labor. Aggregate consumption evolves according to a standard Euler equation,
b fw  Ew [b fw+1]  
³
b lw+1  Ew [b w+1]
´
> (1)
where A0(  6=1 )is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, b fw denotes consumption, b lw+1 is the
nominal interest rate, and b w  b sw  b sw1 stands for in ation. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
, regulates the sensitivity of the consumption path to the Fisherian real interest rates, i.e. b uw+1  b lw+1 
Ew [b w+1]. We approximate the labor supply as follows,
b zw  b sw 
1

b fw + *b kw> (2)
7Often, the literature has focused on the role of nancial intermediation to nance the wage bill instead of the investment bill
(see, e.g., Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001). We look at the nancing model instead because it emphasizes the impact of nancial
frictions. The idea is that investment -unlike labor- is an intertemporal decision. Therefore, the nancial accelerator model not
only has the potential to amplify the eects of a shock, but by constraining capital accumulation it also propagates the eects
of the shock over time.12
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where *A0 denotes precisely the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, b kw represents labor, b zw are
nominal real wages and b sw is the consumption price index (CPI).
Capital accumulation evolves according to a conventional law of motion,
b nw+1  (1  )b nw + b {w> (3)
where b nw denotes physical capital and b {w stands for investment. Investment dynamics, however, are condi-
tional on our underlying assumptions regarding the costs faced to change the  ow of investment. The rst
equation that we add to our model, as in Bernanke et al. (1999), assumes that this adjustment cost is a
function of the investment-to-capital ratio (aka, CAC function). Investment dynamics are governed by,
b tw  "
³
b {w  b nw
´
> (4)
where " regulates the degree of concavity of the cost function around the steady state. This parameter
directly aects the sensitivity of investment to  uctuations in the real value of installed capital (or Tobin’s
q), b tw, through the investment equation.
We also consider two dierent alternative specications for this adjustment costs. On one hand, we adopt
the Christiano et al. (2005) conjecture that the adjustment cost is a function of investment growth instead











where  regulates the degree of concavity of the cost function around the steady state, and where  5 (0>1) is
the subjective intertemporal discount factor of the households. Implicitly we ought to assume that households
make all the investment decisions or, alternatively, that capital producers are fully-owned by the households
and operate in competitive markets. The parameter  directly aects the sensitivity of investment to
 uctuations in Tobin’s q, but the investment equation in (5) reveals now that investment is both inertial
and forward-looking (unlike in the Bernanke et al., 1999, setting). On the other hand, we also consider the
simpler case in which there are no adjustment costs. Hence, that would imply,
b tw  0= (6)
This case is of particular interest because without the asset price  uctuations captured by Tobin’s q, the
Bernanke et al. (1999) loses the characteristic that asset price movements serve to reenforce credit market
imperfections. For more details on the derivations of the investment equations, see Martínez-García and
Søndergaard (2008).
On the supply-side, besides capital producers, the sector consists of a continuum of wholesale producers
and retailers each located in the interval [0>1]. The wholesale rms are responsible for manufacturing
wholesale goods. In turn, the retailers can be thought as adding a ‘brand’ name to the wholesale good to
introduce dierentiation and, consequently, to gain monopolistic power to charge a retail mark-up8.B o t h ,
8Wholesale producers manufacture wholesale goods in competitive markets and then sell their output to retailers who are
monopolistic competitors. Retailers do nothing other than buy goods from entrepreneurs, dierentiate them (costlessly), then
re-sell them to households. The monopoly power of retailers provides the source of nominal stickiness in the economy; otherwise,13
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wholesale producers and retailers are solely owned by the households.
The wholesale good is the only input used by retailers. For simplicity, we assume that no capital or labor
is added to the retail goods. Retailers choose their price to maximize the expected discounted value of their
net prots, subject to a demand constraint. Due to Calvo-signals (e.g., Calvo, 1983), in each period only a
fraction 1 of the retailers gets to re-optimize. Households do have a taste for all retail varieties, and the
elasticity of substitution across varieties is constant at .T h er e s u l t i n gi n  ation dynamics aggregating over
all retailers are captured by the following process,
b w  Ew [b w+1]+
μ




w  b sw)> (7)
where, for notational convenience, we denote the relative wholesale price as b suz
w  (b sz
w  b sw).T h i se q u a t i o n
takes the form of a conventional Phillips curve. In an environment with price rigidity, retailers will, in
addition to current marginal costs, take into account expected future marginal costs, giving rise to the
forward looking term in the Phillips curve. We can summarize the prots from retailers as follows,
b 
u
w  b sw + b |w +( 1 ) b suz
w = (8)
Naturally, the retailer’s prots are rebated lump-sum to the households.
The wholesale producers require homogenous labor and capital to produce wholesale output. All factor
markets are perfectly competitive, and each producer relies on the same Cobb-Douglas technology. Naturally,
output can be expressed as follows,
b |z
w  b dw +( 1 #)b nw + #b kw> (9)
where # 5 (0>1) is the labor share in the production function, b |z
w denotes the wholesale output and b dw is an
aggregate productivity shock. The productivity shock follows an AR(1) process of the following form,
b dw = db dw1 + %d
w> |d| ? 1> (10)
where %d
w is a zero mean, uncorrelated and normally-distributed innovation. The parameter d determines
the persistence of the productivity shock.
Since wholesale producers operate in a competitive labor market, the real wages paid to households
should be equal to the marginal return on labor. That gives us the following equation for the labor demand,
b zw  b sw  (b sz
w  b sw)+
³
b |z
w  b kw
´
> (11)
Combining equations (2) and (10), we can easily derive a labor market equilibrium condition in the following
terms,
b |z




b fw  *b kw= (12)
This equilibrium condition allows us to internalize the behavior of real wages, but we still have to account
for the cost of capital. Wholesale producers buy the capital stock from capital goods producers at a given
price determined by Tobin’s q, using both internal funds (or net worth as it is called in Bernanke et al., 1999)
retailers play no role.14
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and loans from the nancial system. After purchasing the capital stock, wholesale producers are hit with
an idiosyncratic shocks that aects each entrepreneur’s capital holdings. Subsequently, they must utilize











w+1 + b |z




 b tw> (13)
where the coe!cient (1  ) is obviously related to the steady state of the model, and the in ation rate is
dened as follows b w+1  b sw+1  b sw. We treat  as a free parameter rather than a composite of the structural
parameters of the model to give more  exibility to the representation. The expected returns on capital net of
in ation, b un
w+1  b w+1, must be approximately equal to the marginal returns on capital from the production
function and the cost of buying and re-selling the stock of capital to the capital producers (as captured by
Tobin’s q). The marginal return on capital, which is dened as b suz
w+1 +b |z
w+1 b nw+1, would give us the shadow
value of renting out capital to other rms that can ‘guarantee’ that competitive return. Equation (12) gives
us an asset pricing characterization of the Tobin’s q which is quite instrumental in the model. Thus far, the
model is fairly standard and follows Bernanke et al. (1999), in particular, closely (although expanded to
distinguish between nominal and real variables).
Following the costly state verication framework of Bernanke et al. (1999), wholesale producers cannot
borrow at the riskless rate. The cost of external nancing diers from the risk-free rate because the returns
to capital of the wholesale producers are unobservable from the point of view of the nancial intermediaries.
In order to infer the realized return of the entrepreneur, the bank has to pay a state verication cost. The
banks monitor the producers that default, pay the verication cost and seize the remaining capital. In
equilibrium, wholesale producers borrow up to the point where the expected return to capital equals the




w+1  b w+1
¤
b lw+1  Ew [b w+1]+&
³
b qw+1  b sw  b tw  b nw+1
´
> (14)
which can be decomposed in two terms, the risk-free rate itself and the external nancing premium.9 The
parameter & measures the elasticity of the external nancing premium to variations in wholesale producer
internal funds, measured by its net worth relative to capital expenditures. The higher the producer’s stake
in the project (i.e. the higher Q@STN), the lower the associated moral hazard. As shown explicitly in
Bernanke et al. (1999), the premium over the risk-free rate the nancial intermediary demands is a negative
function of the amount of collateralized net worth. In case producers have su!cient net worth to nance
the entire capital stock, agency problems vanish, so the risk-free rate and the return to capital coincide.
9The key mechanism involves the link between "external nance premium" (the dierence between the cost of funds raised
externally and the opportunity cost of funds internal to the rm) and the net worth of potential borrowers (dened as the
borrowers’ liquid assets plus collateral value of illiquid assets less outstanding obligations).15
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Aggregate net worth for the wholesale producers accumulates according to the following equation10,











b sw1 + b tw1 + b nw
´i
> (15)
where  can be interpreted as a survival rate in the spirit of Bernanke et al. (1999). Alternatively, we prefer
to think of this parameter as an implicit prot-sharing parameter. Households would, accordingly, receive
a constant fraction of that net worth which is not retained in the form of lump-sum dividends. Hence, it is
possible to write an approximation for wholesale prots in the following terms,
b 
z
w  b qw+1= (16)
The parameter , in turn, represents the fraction of capital over net worth in steady state and is taken also as
a free parameter to make our model more  exible. Equation (15) simply tells us that the present discounted
value of next period’s nominal net worth, where net worth is denoted as b qw+1, must be approximately equal
to the current net worth at the beginning of the period adjusted by taking out the cost of capital and adding
the dierential between the returns on capital and the risk-free rate.
The standard goods market equilibrium condition is augmented with a term capturing the costs of variable
bankruptcy derived from the costly-state verication framework of Bernanke et al. (1999),
b |w  fb fw +( 1 f  fvy)b {w + fvy
³
b un
w + b sw1 + b tw1 + b nw
´
> (17)
where f denotes the consumption share, { =( 1  f  fvy) is the investment share, and fvy is the
share attributed to the bankruptcy costs in steady state. In this class of models, the consumption share
is a function of the elasticity of substitution across varieties, , which is a structural parameter, but does
not appear anywhere else in the linearization. Therefore, the consumption share can be viewed as a free
parameter in itself. The share on the costly state verication costs is taken as a free parameter to ensure
that our model is  exible enough; however, we adopt in most of our simulations the assumption that these
costs are negligible in steady state, so fvy =0 .T h ec o s t so fs t a t ev e r i cation are a function of the value of
capital at liquidation plus the returns on capital, all of which is appropriated by the bank after the wholesale
producers declare bankruptcy (and the banks pay for the verication).
In line with most of the literature, we assume that monetary authorities are willing to smooth changes
in the actual short-term nominal interest rate, b lw, but do target in ation and output (the dual mandate).
Short-term rates, however, may deviate unexpectedly from their target rates for exogenous reasons (out of the
control of the monetary authorities). Thus, the monetary policy is determined by the following Taylor-type
interest rate rule,
b lw+1 = lb lw +( 1 l)
£
#b w + #|b |w
¤
+ b pw> (18)
10We rewrite the model without the bankruptcy cost and default threshold parameters of Bernanke et al. (1999), and we
implicitly assume that in a deterministic steady state the costs of bankruptcy must be approximately equal to zero. There are
a couple of reasons to do so. First, it allows us to refrain from assumptions about the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity
s h o c k s ,a sw e l la si t sp a r a m e t e r s .T h i sa p p r o a c ha v o i d san u m b e ro fc o m p u t a t i o n a ld i !culties, as in Meier and Müller (2005).
Second, the remaining parameters can arise in related frameworks. One particular strand of models we have in mind is that
of limited enforcement (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). Although the underlying microeconomic assumptions are entirely
dierent, these models give rise to similar nancial accelerators.16
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where l is the smoothing parameter, # and #| are the weights on in ation an output for the target rate,
and b pw denes the monetary shock in the economy. The monetary policy shock follows an AR(1) process of
the following form,
b pw = p b pw1 + %p
w > |p| ? 1> (19)
where %p
w is a zero mean, uncorrelated, and normally-distributed innovation. The parameter p determines
the persistence of the monetary shock.
Up to this point, we have followed very closely the derivation of the linearized equilibrium conditions in
Bernanke et al. (1999). The main dierences arise because we have implicitly subsumed the role of entrepre-
neurs operating the wholesale producers into the households. We have adopted the view that entrepreneurial
labor is negligible and that the net worth of producers that go bankrupt is rebated directly to the households
as dividends rather than consumed by a dierent agent in the form of an entrepreneur. In that sense, we
view wholesale producers strictly as rms whose sole ownership corresponds to the households. We contend
that this variations are rather minor and do not aect the principal characteristics of the nancial accelerator
developed in Bernanke et al. (1999).
A More Complex Financing Structure. The Miller-Modigliani theorem asserts that, under perfect
capital markets, economic decisions do not depend on nancial structure. An obvious implication is that
the addition of nancial intermediaries to this environment has no consequences for real activity. Here,
we attempt to revive the idea that the services provided by nancial intermediaries or banks are important
determinants of aggregate economic performance. The banking sector in the model of Bernanke et al. (1999)
is fully described by the equilibrium conditions described up until this point.
The implicit assumption is that banks are perfectly competitive and that the deposits held by households
at intermediaries must be equal the total loanable funds supplied to the wholesale producers to nance their
capital acquisitions in every period, i.e.
b ow  b gw>
where b gw represents the nominal amount of deposits in the nancial intermediaries. While the banks oer
deposits and loans, the demand for those deposits has to be met by the households and the demand for
those loans by the wholesale producers. Therefore, in this setting, households nance the external funding
needs of wholesale producers and all the relevant features in the nancial side are summarized in the implicit
costly-state verication contract (and how it handles the moral hazard problem posited) as described by
Bernanke, et al. (1999).
Until now, we have departed from Bernanke, et al. (1999) only slightly. Here, however, we propose a
non-negligible expansion of the model in which the balance sheet of the banking sector is no longer trivial.
First, we need to take into account that the demand for loans from the nancial intermediaries is simply
equal to the dierence between the value of capital acquired and the net worth (internal funds), i.e.
b ow 
³
b sw1 + b tw1 + b nw
´
 b qw= (20)
Second, we need to take into account that the demand for deposits can be determined by the budget17
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constraint of households, i.e.
SF
SF+ G




























We already know from equations (8) and (16) that the dividends received by the households can be expressed
in terms of other endogenous variables. As a result, it follows that,
SF
SF+G (b sw + b fw)+ G
SF+G
b gw+1  ZK
SF+G
³








b lw + b gw
´
+ u
SF+G [b sw + b |w +( 1 ) b suz
w ]+ z
SF+Gb qw+1=
Similarly, using the labor demand equation in (11) it easily follows that,
SF
SF+G (b sw + b fw)+ G
SF+G
b gw+1  ZK
SF+G (b sz







b lw + b gw
´
+ u




These two equations would be su!cient to close the model in Bernanke et al. (1999) and to pin down
deposits and loans, and it must be the case that they equate.
We are going to introduce, however, two twists on the balance sheet of the banking sector. First, we











(1  ') b gw> (22)
where b ew denotes the bank capital in nominal terms, b gw is the nominal value of deposits, and ' represents
the reserve requirement on real deposits. In other words, the total amount of loans must be a combination
of bank capital plus the fraction of deposits not subject to reserve requirement. Deposits held at the central
bank in the form of reserves do not earn interest.11 Notice that E
O can be interpreted as the long-run steady
state leverage ratio of the banking system. As a result, the regulator can aect the total amount of loans in
the economy by manipulating the reserve requirement.
Second, we assume that there is a regulatory lower bound on the leverage ratio of the banking capital
such that,
b ew  fob ow
This implies that the bank capital has to be above a minimum statutory leverage ratio, fo. The minimum
leverage ratio these days, for instance, is 4%. We make the implicit assumption that E
O  fo.O n ew a yt o
interpret this restriction is to say that whenever it is binding, i.e. if
b ew  fob ow> (23)
banks will only be able to take on a total amount of deposits that is proportional to the available capital.
11Currently, reserve requirements held at the Federal Reserve do not pay interest. In 2006, congress gave the Federal Reserve
permission to pay interest on reserves, but mandated that this wait until 2011 to take place. The Federal Reserve has requested
permission to start this program immediately. The Federal Reserve has argued that paying interest would deter banks from
lending out excess reserves and as such would make it easier for the Fed to attain its target rate.18
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Clearly, the regulator can also aect the demand for deposits and the amount of available loans by changing
the requirements. Another way to think about the constraint environment is to say that loans are rationed
and the amount of deposits is capped too. That’s what our previous derivations entail. Replacing this into
the equation for the deposit demand it follows that,
SF
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We assume that b ew, bank reserves, evolve exogenously. The bank capital follows an AR(1) process of the
following form,
b ew = b ew1 + %e
w> (25)
where %e
w is a zero mean, uncorrelated and normally-distributed innovation. The parameter ,w h i c hr e p r e -
sents time-preference as well as the inverse of the long-run interest rate, determines the persistence of the
bank capital process. We also assume that there is an exogenous probability of becoming constrained which
is determined uniquely by the current value of b ew and the distribution shocks.
3 Simulation and Estimation
The principal contribution of our model is to add a ‘constrained’ state of nature. In this constrained state,
the model economy has no nancial acceleration of the monetary transmission mechanism. We begin by
illustrating this phenomenon empirically. The impact of this constraint is than monetary policy both during
and prior to the constrained state will necessarily be dierent that policy in a world in which this state is
encountered with probability zero. We thus illustrate how monetary policy die r sa c r o s st h et w os t a t e so f
the world and compare it to optimal Taylor rules for economies that are fully unconstrained.
Finally, we calibrate our model, separately, to match US and European economies. Our hypothesis is
that the presence of a capital constraint should be re ected in the monetary policy stances of the respective
authorities both before and during the current crisis.
We begin by using relatively standard computational tools to show results from two isolated economies,
one of which is constrained and one unconstrained. For the second question, as well as the calibration to the
two economies, we will use simulated generalized methods of moments (S-GMM) in order to obtain answers.
Essentially we will need to nd monetary policy parameters that optimize some loss function with respect
to the shocks in the economy and the model that we have specied. This is a problem well suited to the
mechanics of S-GMM as one needs to estimate optimal parameters in the absence of information about the
economy’s behavior under a range of counterfactuals. Using the model, we can simulate the economy under
a wide range of parameter possibilities and use S-GMM to yield policy functions in a consistent way.19
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3.1 Parameters
As our goal here is to comment on the role of monetary policy in the context of banking sector stress, we
follow the literature in the choice of parameter values. A range of parameters will apply to our baseline
model and will be appropriate to the US and Europe. We begin by setting labor share to 0=64, and quarterly
capital depreciation is set to 0=025. Our Calvo-price stickiness parameter is set at 0=75, and inverse labor
supply elasticity is set to 3. Each of these parametric choices follows Bernanke, et al. (1999) exactly. We also
set the discount rate to a quarterly 0=971 and the elasticity of substitution across varieties to 1=05.K y d l a n d
and Prescott (1982) calibrated the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to 0=66 and Lucas (1990) argued
that even 0=5 appears too low for macro data. For comparability, our elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is set at 0=5. What we have called the sensitivity to the external nance premium,  ,i sxed at 0=25.
Capital adjustment costs are set at 0=999,a n dt h ep r o tr e i n v e s t m e n tr a t ei ss e ta tac o n s t a n t0=8.W e
parameterize our Taylor rule as follows. Interest rate inertia, l,i ss e ta t0=9. As well, we set steady state
nominal bank capital to 0=15.W e f o l l o w B e r n a n k e ,et al. (1999) in imposing a unit root on productivity.
The shocks themselves are zero mean, with uncorrelated innovations whose variance is xed at 0=0066.
Recall that our goals are to show that the model has implications for monetary policy across states of
the world and to calibrate to the US and European economies. Because none of these variables will dier
across the two economies, nor impact the transition across states of the world, the precise value will not
impact the stylized conclusions of the paper.
For a small set of parameters, we will specify dierences across the US and Europe. In the US, we set the
leverage maximum to 25, which implies a Tier 1 capital to asset ratio of 0=04. Basel I requirements stipulate
that a Tier 1 capital12 to assets ratio of below 0=04 implies that the institution is ‘undercapitalized.’ Being
‘well capitalized’ requires a Tier 1 capital to assets ratio of above 0=06.W eu s et h e0=04 level for the industry
as this re e c t st h ep o i n ta tw h i c hnancial institutions can be considered in ‘distress’ from the point of view
of the regulator, which in turn means that monetary policy becomes almost completely ineective. Though
regulation vary across Europe, European bank leverage has been somewhat higher than that in the US. We
set the minimum capital to asset ratio to 0=025. We provide some sensitivity analysis around this value
below.
Finally, we parameterize the shock process for capital. The variance of the capital shock is set to 0.012
in the US and to 0.0081 in Europe. To obtain these values, we use Bankscope to extract the time series of
quarterly aggregate industry capital ratio from 1999 Q1 to 2009 Q4.
Our parameter choices are summarized in Table 1.
3.2 Methodology
Thus, we begin with a standard simulation exercise to answer question 1 by looking at two economies
separately. One is the standard unconstrained banking system popularized by Bernanke, et al. (1999),
modied in the ways discussed above and studied also by many others. The other is the constrained system.
In the constrained economy, banks cannot expand lending as capital levels lie below the regulatory threshold.
In each of the two economies, the central bank follows a Taylor rule.
12Tier 1 capital is dened as common equity, non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock and minority interests in equity
accounts of minority shareholders.20
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The goal of course, is then to nd Taylor parameters that minimize some objective function. To answer
this question, we use simulated generalized method of methods (S-GMM). The object is to estimate a













,w h e r eS is the vector of all parameters of the specied system (see table 1). A
simulated GMM approach minimizes the weighted distance between moments of the data, PG,a n dm o m e n t s
produced from a simulation of the model using a vector of parameters, Pv (;S). Thus one wants an estimate
of  to minimize the function,
D()=
¡




Pg  Pv (;S)
¢0
where Z is an appropriate weight matrix.
As there is no clear analytic representation of the mapping of  to the relevant moments, one can solve
this type of minimization problem by simulation. Given vectors  and S, we can generate full time-paths of
economic processes using the steady-state equations in this paper. Using the output of these processes, such
as relevant impulse response functions, we can calculate moments, Pg> to estimate the above. In our case
our full parameter vector is the set of four Taylor-rule parameters and the remaining parameters of the full
system. For the purposes of this analysis, we will take the parameters contained in the vector S as given
and estimate the four Taylor-rule parameters using a variant of S-GMM.
Because optimal monetary policy parameter is conditioned on the model of the economy used, in our
case, the analog to a moment from the data, Pg, is simply the moments that are generated from the steady-
state model. Thus, we can interpret Pv (;S) as the moments that are derived from a given set of shocks,
conditional on the model economy. We use the absolute value integral of the deviation from steady-state
of output and in ation. That is, all deviations from steady state receive equal punishment, whether up
or down. Thus a shock to output that causes output to decline, then increase above steady state before
returning would receive a value equal to the absolute value of the integral of the impulse response function
below steady state plus the absolute value of the integral for the time period above. By assumption, the
model produces steady-state values for output and in ation and deviations can be regarded as negative
outcomes. Since the baseline in this model is indeed the steady state, we can reduce the equation above to
re ect the fact that optimal monetary policy is typically derived by looking at variation from a specied loss
function. We can specify that the GMM objective function is now,
D()=( Pv ())Z (Pv ())
0 =
Notice that the Pg have disappeared as these moments are by denition zero. If the moments specied
here are |()  | and ||()  ||,t h e nw eh a v eaS - G M Mm e t h o do fe s t i m a t i o nt h a tm a p sb a c ki n t oa
standard view of the loss function as absolute value deviations from optimal levels of  and |.N o t i c et h a t
this corresponds to a mechanism to nd the Taylor parameters that lead to the smallest deviations from
steady state.
One could in principle also use moments from the data, PG, and optimize over monetary policy in order
to nd the parameter vector . This corresponds to estimation of the existing historical Taylor rules. The
dierence between this data approach and ours highlights a methodological distinction. We allow the model
to ‘speak’ on its own, a gurative tying of our hand behind our backs. In that, we are not tting the21
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model to the data, but instead conjecturing a model of the economy and letting it determine a ‘best’ policy
response. We believe that consistent ndings in this approach provide support for the claims of the model.
As well, we sidestep di!cult questions that would come with a data approach; for example, we do not need
to claim knowledge of the precise timing of a bank capital shock.
We compute moments as follows. For each exogenous shock, %,s p e c i ed in the full system below, we
compute the integral above for (>%) and |(>%). Beginning with evaluation of two shocks, %d and %e,t o
productivity and bank capital, we have four moments to estimate and four output parameters. The weighting
matrix, Z, is generated using the covariance matrix of shocks derived from a evolution of the system with
all shocks allowed to propagate simultaneously. We search over a large number of combinations of  using
grid-search methods. For each of these, we can solve the function above, where the lowest value of D()








),w h e r et h e
superscripts x>f refer to the unconstrained and constrained states respectively.
Full description of the estimation method is included in the appendix.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Constrained Economies Have No Transmission Mechanism
Figure 4 below shows the results from the initial stage of simulation using a US calibration. The chart shows
the output and interest rate responses to a productivity shock in each of our two regimes. Recall that our
rst exercise is one in which the two regimes are fully isolated. The constrained and unconstrained cases in
the gure re ect separate economies, each one trapped in a dierent absorbing state of the aggregate shock.
One can think of the dierence between the two as being a dierence in available bank capital for lending.
Regardless, one can see much of the intuition behind the joint model in these gures. As placeholders,
we specify a set of Taylor rule parameters for use here. We specify # =1 =5 and #| =0 =5 for both the
constrained and unconstrained cases in accord with recent literature (see Rudebusch 2006). We return to
this set of unconstrained parameters in the sensitivity tests below.
Consider table 2. To create this table, we estimate a set of 12 impulse response functions for the response
of output to a productivity shock. The rst two columns consider the constrained case and the latter two
columns the unconstrained case. Columns 1 and 3 show the magnitude of initial change in output as a result
of a shock to productivity. Columns 2 and 4 show the impact of the policy response from the lowest output
point to the highest. Recall that we have partitioned the world into two absorbing states for the time being.
Each row denes a steady state ratio of bank capital to loans.
Notice a couple of features. First, the magnitudes in the constrained case are unchanging across spec-
ications of bank capital level. This is a product of the fact that the nancial accelerator in the model
economy for the constrained world does not function. If it did, the responsiveness of the economy would
be a function of bank leverage. This leads to the second point - the accelerator is functioning in the un-
constrained world. The magnitude of the economic responses is clearly dependent on bank leverage and
increasing with it. When the economy is in a de-leveraged state in the unconstrained world, as seen in the
bottom couple of rows, the accelerator begins to function. Even in the cases where there is ample capital,
setting the model to the ‘constrained’ state shuts down the transmission mechanism.13
13Interpreting the magnitudes of the impulse response functions (IRFs) here is di!c u l tg i v e nt h a tt h ew o r l di n d e e dc h a n g e s22
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4.2 Consistent with U.S. Patterns
Here we look for optimal Taylor parameters using the S-GMM method described above and in the appendix.
Because similar exercise to evaluate optimal Taylor rules do not account for the presence of a constrained
economy, our results may dier. In particular, the existing literature eectively includes averaged results for
Taylor parameters, indeed, this could explain why central bank actions appear to have deviated so strongly
from consensus rules during the crisis. When a constrained state exist, monetary authorities have to include
its presence as a potential factor when determining policy, even during normal times. As such, higher capital
volatility, and thus risk of crisis, could lead to precautionary monetary policy.
We nd optimal parameters in each state of the world as shown in Table 3. The unconstrained parameter
t reasonably well with priors on the behavior of the central bank. Prior literature has led to the conclusion of
Taylor rule parameters with magnitudes of the in ation and output of approximately 1.5 and 1.0 respectively;
however, with the authority’s knowledge of the presence of a constrained world, one may need to consider
anew the parameters that would prevail. In particular, notice that the model economy here contains nancial
sector features that lead to larger output responses to shocks than model with no nancial frictions.
The most remarkable feature of the results is the presence of a large negative value for #
f
, the bank’s
response to movements in the rate of in ation in the constrained state. Of course, a large negative number
implies that the central bank will lower interest rates in the face of rising in ation. This is likely to stoke
in ation and increase it further, leading to spiraling increasing rates. The only way for the economy to
recover from this is for bank capital to rise and return the economy to the unconstrained state in which the
central bank will then work in the opposite direction. So, why pursue this path? Lowering the interest rate
has the eect, in our model, of devaluing debt. By doing so, this directly increases bank capital. Since the
bank has no way to impact the real economy as the accelerator has disappeared, the only way to recover
is to impose an in ation-based transfer to the banking sector. To the extent that one can view the crisis
as a shock to bank capital, the most eective solution, according to the mechanisms in our model, is to
lower interest rates and accommodate in ation. This pattern would then be reversed at the point that bank
capitalization has returned to the unconstrained state.
4.3 Consistent with European Patterns
We repeat the above exercise using a European parameterization. As mention above, most of the parameters
of this economy will remain as above. Again, we look for optimal Taylor parameters using the S-GMM method
described above and in the appendix. We report the optimal parameters in each state of the world as shown
in Table 3, panel B.
Our principal result is that the coe!cient on the monetary policy sensitivity to interest rates in both
states of the world is larger than the US equivalent. While in some parameterizations, we again observe a
negative coe!cient on the in ation parameter, it remains close to zero even in the constrained state. This
is consistent both with mandate dierences and observed policy.
One notable feature of the dierence between US and European monetary reactions to the crisis was
the timing of the reaction. This dierence is in part described by the dierence in output responsiveness.
between states, thus a characterization of a shock that impacts bank capital and may change the state may not accurately be
re ected here. Regardless, the table is instructive in understanding the dierence in transmission mechanisms between the two
states of the world.23
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Another reason lies in the ‘distance’ to the constrained region. This can be seen as follows. Consider
that prior to the crisis, both the US and Europe banks held a given, and equal level of capital. A lower
baseline capital requirement in Europe means that the European Central Bank monetary changes will have
an accelerator impact even when US actions are insu!cient. This impact is apparent in gure 1. Thus for
similar levels of shock, the US will necessary enter the constrained state sooner than Europe.
Finally, recall that the set of results in based on a calibration that re ects dierences in capital thresholds
as well as monetary stance. Thus, one can interpret the outcomes as re ective of the combination of monetary
stance and regulatory regime. Our interpretation is that the relatively stronger anti-in ationary stance of
ECB in the face of a crisis emerges both as a function of its mandate and the fact that it had greater
 exibility is exercising monetary policy prior to its banking sector becoming fully constrained. Thus, a
relatively smaller change in policy rates could lead to a larger economic eect.
4.4 Conventional Wisdom
As mentioned, our results dier slightly from conventional wisdom, both in the presence of an pro-in ationary
response to the constrained state, and in a small degree of dierence in the normal, unconstrained, state
of the world. To assess whether our results are robust, we re-run our S-GMM estimation with the added
constraint that the unconstrained parameter are xed at standard level. This would be tantamount the
unreasonable assumption of a myopic central banker. Nonetheless, the process is instructive in understanding
the mechanisms present in our model economy.
Eectively, for each of the US and Europe, we will evaluate the degree to which the our results in normal
times are impacted on the margin by the presence of a constrained state.
For the United States, we look at the conventional Taylor Rule of #
x
 =1 =5 and #
x
| =0 =5. For Europe
we use #
x
 =2 =0 and #
x
| =0 =25,r e  ecting a stronger anti-in ationary stance and a very mild pro-output








|. Results for this exercise are in table 4.
In the US case, we notice that the magnitude of #
f
 is largely the same as the baseline case: 2=25
rather than 2=00= As we pre-specify the unconstrained in ation parameter to be 1.5, the strength of the
pro-in ation reaction in times of crisis is slightly diminished. This is reasonable given the structure of our
economy. A central banker that ignores the presence of a constrained state is not very hawkish in regular
times. This means that, to maintain time-consistent, once in crisis, the future has, on average, more in ation
than our baseline case. As such, the central banker does not need to  ood the economy to quite the degree
as before.
In the European case, we nd a similar eect, though of dierent magnitudes. Indeed, once we set the
unconstrained case to 2=00, the constrained case increases to the same level. In this context, there is no
change between states of the world: the central bank continues to follow its anti-in ation mandate regardless
of the state of the nancial sector. This is consistent with both the ECB mandate as well as its arms-length
relationship with the banking sector.
5 Discussion and Implication for Regulation
Optimal regulation
Essential for our analysis, the nonlinearity discussed in this model implies a strong incentive for the joint
monetary/regulatory authority to ensure that nancial institutions remain above the capital constraint. In24
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times of falling asset values, banks will approach or fall below capital requirements, rendering monetary
policy ineective at stimulating lending. At this point, the monetary/regulatory authority has an incentive
to lower capital requirements in order to facilitate monetary intervention (see Figure 1,P a n e lE). In fact,
doing so may lead to lower output volatility in the long run. Figure 5 shows the result of an exercise that
consider the decision of a joint authority that must set monetary policy each period as well as may make a
one-time adjustment to the capital adequacy threshold. In each simulation, the central bank is allowed to
lower the threshold a single time. Doing so provides uniform benets. Beginning with a threshold of 0.1, we
look at the output volatility in an economy for each of a number of possibilities. As should be clear, output
volatility falls uniformly with decreased threshold. Of course this model does not include the associated risk
of low capitalization on risk taking or the spillover eects of bank failures on the economy; nonetheless, it
provides some insight into the tradeos faced by a joint authority in the management of a crisis. There
appear to be relatively large gains from lowering regulatory requirements both on the e!cacy of monetary
policy and on output volatility.
Eectively, our explanation rests on the logic that the central bank has an incentive to restore the
functioning of the nancial sector. Even if this leads to a short-run in ation cost, the long-run output
benets are su!ciently large to oset. In particular, this is true even without an explicit targeting of
nancial stability itself.
Pro-cyclicality
As has been acknowledged, bank capital follows a cyclical pattern. This cyclicality combined with a xed
capital requirement can lead to excess capital in good times and insu!cient capital in bad times. Thus as
the economy begins to contract, and banks experience loan losses, they will become less likely to lend as their
capital cushions erode. Indeed, regulators may be in a position to shut down institutions that are simply
facing cyclical losses, but will soon recover with the rest of the economy. This implies a potential solution
of cycle-dependent capital requirements.
Our model suggests a second set of reasons for this type of cyclical requirement. In ‘bad’ times as banks
becomes capital constrained, not only is their lending impacted, but monetary policy changes as well. As we
have demonstrated, because the e!cacy of policy changes, the stance of policy necessarily changes as well.
Thus, a pro-cyclical regulatory policy has the potential to ameliorate boom-bust monetary policy cycles.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We believe that there are likely many reasons for the dierences in ECB and Fed policies over the past
two years. Among these are dierence in mandate emphasis between the two that lead to stronger anti-
in ationary emphasis at the ECB, dierences in the timing of impact on the banking sector, and many
others. That said, the model presented here is both consistent with both authorities’ actions and is capable
of reproducing the stylized features of each. With this framework in place, there are potentially more open
questions that lie beyond the scope of this paper. As mentioned, the Federal Reserve has responsibility
both for monetary policy and bank regulation of some of the nancial system. Indeed, much of the response
to the crisis in the United States consisted of extraordinary support to banking institutions; this is largely25
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equivalent to a relaxation of capital requirements. Thus, to what extent does the ability to change regulatory
requirements jointly with monetary policy change the optimization problem? We would hypothesize that
this is consistent with current patterns - a relatively higher capital requirement in normal times in the US
and stronger monetary policy during times of crisis. However, this is a topic that we leave for future study.
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Appendix
A S-GMM Computational Procedure
Step 1. Parameterization of the model
Bernanke, et al. (1999) provides much of the theoretical framework of the model we are considering.
Accordingly, we adopt many of their key assumptions — including most of the parameter values used in
their simulation and when appropriate these values are supplemented with well established values from the
literature. The detail of which is in our structural parameter list. Our model, however, is a signicant
extension of the existing literature and we have introduced complexities and parameters which, to our
knowledge, have no analogue in existing studies. The values chosen and rationale behind these values can
be found in the paper.
Step 2. Determine appropriate grid for examination









| (collectively referred to as ). To do so, we dene a range of values for each #-parameter
and calculate the value of the loss function for each permutation. Regulatory authorities in an unconstrained





| to range from [0.1:0.1:2.5]. In the constrained world we have fewer ap r i o r iassumptions about the




| to range from [-2.5:0.1:2.5].
Step 3. Run unconstrained Dynare process




| values, we use Dynare to solve the DSGE model (in this case
the unconstrained process). The details of the Dynare process are, by assumption, familiar to most and as
such are omitted here. The Dynare output of interest is the rst-order Taylor approximation of the decision
and transition functions. For each combination of # values, we calculate and store these approximations.
Step 4. Run constrained Dynare process




| values we obtain the linearized coe!cients for the constrained
model and store the results.
Step 5. Establish threshold values and transition process
At this point we have two linearized solutions for a set of parameters, . We now implement the innovative
feature of our model — the incorporation of both states (constrained and unconstrained) into a single policy
function. To do so we must specify the mechanism by which policy makers decide how to react to deviations




. As such we specify a probabilistic value of a shock to bank capital in steady state
that will result in a constrained banking system. The value is uniquely determined by the variance of the
shock, , and the current distance of bank capital to the regulatory threshold.
Of course, the behavior of the monetary authority and the transition process between the two states is a
b i th a r d e rt od e ne. For computational simplicity, we assume that the world is considered wholly constrained
or wholly unconstrained if, for a given level of bank capital and distribution of shocks, there is less than a 1%
possibility that a shock will cause the banking system to change from one regime to the other. Policy makers
in this environment have simple policy prescriptions — implement the optimal policy of the current state
of the world (be it unconstrained or constrained). However policy makers who operate in an environment28
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where there is a plausible risk to the banking sector do not have such straightforward prescriptions.
Policy makers who have a realistic probability of transitioning from one regime to the other in the
next period face a more signicant problem — should they blindly continue to implement the policy of the
unconstrained/constrained world? Or should they take some other more pro-active action? To account for
this ambiguity we assume that policy makers take a measured approach which weights the optimal policy from




will transition the economy from one state to the other. As the process nears the boundary between states,
this average policy re ects an approximation of behavior in a uncertain environment.
Step 6. Run shock process
We now have a process which addresses constrained and unconstrained economies as well as economies
which are transitioning between the two states. Next, we evaluate the deviations from steady state, given ,
due to shocks. Specically we are interested in the response of output and in ation to productivity and bank
capital shocks. With the coe!cients from the two linearized models we simulate a shock process identical to
that performed by Dynare, with the exception of a dynamic coe!cient choice. As previously mentioned we
weight the coe!cients generated in Step 3 and Step 4 by the probability of entering the constrained world,
sf. Thus we simulate the model:
|w =( 1 sf)  x|w1 + sf  f|w1 + %
Where |w are the endogenous variable of interest, x and f are the linearized coe!cients from Step 3
a n dS t e p4 ,a n d|w1 is the previous periods endogenous value.
Step 7. Calculate moments for each psi-shock combination
The impulse response functions generated in Step 6 provide the basis for comparison for dierent  values.
Specically we calculate moments based on the path of the impulse response functions. We then repeat steps





Step 8. Select parameter value with minimum moment value
The GMM process minimizes the moments of the loss function such that:
D()=( Pv (;))Z (Pv (;))
0 =
The resultant  values that produce the minimum distortions from the steady state are then deemed the
optimal policy parameters for our dynamic-two state model.
Step 9. Rene grid and repeat
On a course grid we have been able to achieve optimal parameter values, however without a high degree
of specicity. Once we achieve a rough estimate of points we rene the grid points and rerun steps 2-8.
Step 10. Verify existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
Uniqueness: Note that our GMM method is global. That is, we do not use any search or optimization
techniques to nd the optimal ; as a result, we can minimize the moment function without concern that
there exists alternate, smaller values. We cannot rule out the presence of solutions that lie between the grid
points of our search.29
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Existence: We verifty empirically the presence of equilbrium, by ensuring that with each optimization
there exists at least one valid parameter combination.
B The Complete Log-Linearized Model
As a notational convention, all variables identied with lower-case letters and a caret on top represent a
transformation of the corresponding variable in upper-case letters. They are variables in logs and expressed
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Evolution of the State Variables.
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Monetary Policy Rule and Shock Processes.
b lw+1 = lb lw +( 1 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h
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Denitions.
b w  b sw  b sw1=31
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Taylor Rule Residual Fed Target Rate34
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DiscountFactor ɴ 0.971 0.971
ElasticityofSubstitutionacrossVarieties ɽ 1.05 1.05
ElasticityofIntertemporalSubstitution ʍ 0.5 0.5
(Inverse)ElasticityofLaborSupply Ԅ 3 3 Bernankeetal.(1999)





w/K)+(1Ͳɷ))) ɸ 0.7 0.7
CalvoPriceStickinessParameter ɲ 0.75 0.75 Bernankeetal.(1999)
DepreciationRate ɷ 0.025 0.025 Bernankeetal.(1999)
CapitalAdjustmentCost ʖ 0.999 0.999
ProfitReinvestmentShare 1Ͳɺ 0.99 0.98
LaborShare ʗ 0.64 0.64 Bernankeetal.(1999)
ParametersontheTaylorRule:
InterestRateInertia ʌ i 0.9 0.9 Bernankeetal.(1999)
ExogenousShockParameters:




Consumption C0 . 7 0 . 7
NominalBankCapital B 0.25 0.25
NominalBankLoans L1 . 0 21 . 0 2
ConsumptionPriceIndex P 0.97 0.97
NominalDeposits D 1.01 1.01
NominalWage W 1.02 1.02





Output Y 0.99 0.99
Investment X0 . 1 0 . 1
GovernmentExpenditures G 0.2 0.2





RealCostofCapital Q 0.999 0.999
Capital K1 1
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Table2a:FinancialAcceleratorin'normal'times(US)
B InitialDecline OutputResponse InitialDecline OutputResponse
0.25 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563 Ͳ0.0136 0.0197
0.5 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563 Ͳ0.0130 0.0194
0.75 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563 Ͳ0.0103 0.0171
1.02 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563
1.25 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563 NA NA
1.5 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563 NA NA
Table2b:FinancialAcceleratorin'normal'times(EU)
B InitialDecline OutputResponse InitialDecline OutputResponse
0.25 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563 Ͳ0.0297 0.0388
0.5 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563 Ͳ0.0257 0.0348
0.75 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563 Ͳ0.0169 0.0261
1.02 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563
1.25 Ͳ0.0470 0.0563 Ͳ1.1424 1.2956
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